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Abstract
This paper analyzes a simple game with n players. We fix a mean, µ, in the
interval [0, 1] and let each player choose any random variable distributed on that
interval with the given mean. The winner of the zero-sum game is the player
whose random variable has the highest realization. We show that the position
of the mean within the interval is paramount. Remarkably, if the given mean is
above a crucial threshold then the unique equilibrium must contain a point mass
on 1. The cutoff is strictly decreasing in the number of players, n; and for fixed
µ, as the number of players is increased, each player places more weight on 1 at
equilibrium. We characterize the equilibrium as the number of players goes to
infinity.
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1 Introduction
Consider the following problem faced by a group of n manufacturers of some good.
Each manufacturer produces the same undifferentiated product, which sells for some
exogenously given price. The manufacturers are constrained by the production process
into producing goods of the same given average quality; however, they can choose the
distribution of the good’s quality–by being, say, more by-the-book and rigid a producer
can ensure a more constant quality; or by being more flexible and hands-off he can
achieve a wider spread of quality realizations. There is some buyer who wants to buy
the good, and she naturally would like the good with the highest quality. Moreover,
before she makes her choice of product, she may inspect the goods in order to accurately
pick out the best one. What distribution over qualities should a producer choose in
order to maximize the change that his product is best?
One might suspect, ex ante, that optimal choice of distribution would be the distri-
bution with the highest variance. However, as we show in this paper, that is not the
case, and instead it is the uniform distribution that is king.
This model can be formalized as the following n-player game. We fix a mean, µ and
have each player simultaneously choose the distribution of a random variable with real-
izations constrained to a common interval–without loss, [0, 1]–such that the expectation
of the random variable is the given µ. The winner of this zero-sum game is the player
with the highest realization of his random variable. Each player’s objective; therefore,
is to maximize the probability that the realized value of his random variable is higher
than that of his opponents.
Our results are as follows. There is a unique symmetric equilibrium: if µ = 1/n then
both players play a distribution with cdf F (x) = x1/(n−1) supported on the whole interval
[0, 1], and if µ < 1/n they each play a distribution with the same curvature on a smaller
interval of support, [0, nµ]. The key is that for j 6= i, the distribution of maxj 6=iXj is
the uniform distribution. On the other hand, if the given mean is greater than 1/n then
each player places a point mass on 1 and the remainder of the distribution is continuous,
supported on a subset of [0, 1]. Holding µ fixed, as the number of players increases, the
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weight placed on 1 increases. As n goes to infinity, the unique symmetric equilibrium
converges to one where each player chooses a distribution consisting of two point masses
on 0 and 1. Finally, we show that these results can be extended to a modified case where
the maximal support of the distribution is any interval that is a subset of [0,+∞).
1.1 Applications and Discussion
We believe that this model has numerous applications. Perhaps foremost among these
uses is that of competitive information design, or persuasion. This setup models the
situation where a group of principals compete over information provision to a risk neutral
agent where the principals and the agent share a common prior with binary support.
Indeed, our problem is equivalent to one where agents each choose an experiment in
the Kamenica and Gentzkow [12] sense, given the common binary prior. Real world
examples of this problem include sellers choosing how much information to convey about
their products to a buyer with unknown tastes, schools competitively choosing grading
policies for their respective candidates (as in [7]), and political parties attempting to
persuade a voter to choose their candidate (as in [1]).
More generally, when the probability space is one dimensional this problem of choos-
ing a signal structure becomes one of choosing a Blackwell experiment (see [4]).1 As a
result, this paper can be interpreted as solving the same problem but with fewer con-
straints. Put a different way, while the general competitive persuasion question looks
for the equilibrium where each player chooses a distribution of posteriors subject to the
constraint that the distribution of posteriors be Bayes-plausible, this paper looks for the
equilibrium where the constraints are now the two conditions that the maximal support
and mean of the posterior and the prior must be the same.
For a prior distribution with binary support, our formulation is precisely the com-
petitive persuasion problem, without any loss of generality. However, it is easy to see
1This approach was introduced as a method for examining persuasion problems in Gentzkow and
Kamenica [10], and a number of other papers have followed that interpret the information design
problem as one of choosing an optimal Blackwell experiment. Some other recent examples include [14]
and [15].
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that this is not generally true for other prior distributions. For instance, suppose that
the prior consisted merely of a weight of 1 on 1/2. Obviously, there is no signal struc-
ture that could convince a decision maker that the expected value of the object were
anything other than 1/2, and certainly we could not achieve a distribution on posteriors
that yielded a uniform distribution on expected values. This intuition is apposite for any
distribution with support on n 6= 2 points, where n is allowed to be uncountably infinite
(i.e. where the prior is non-atomic)–if there is too much weight towards the barycenter
of the prior, a uniform distribution of expected rewards is simply not Bayes-plausible.
In part, this paper bears resemblance to Condorelli and Szentes [8]. In [8], the
authors characterize the equilibrium of a simple game consisting of a monopolistic seller
and a buyer. The buyer may choose the cdf of her valuation; and then the seller,
after observing the distribution but not the realization, makes an offer to the buyer.
This of course is related to Roesler and Szentes [16], where instead of observing her
valuation, the buyer merely receives a signal about it. The authors then characterize
the properties of this buyer-optimal signal structure. Concordantly, here, we look at
the (relatively) unconstrained problem, which provides insight as to the solution to the
general competitive persuasion problem.
The approach taken in this paper differs greatly from that taken by other papers
in the information design literature. Because the distribution chosen by our players is
free from the Bayes’ plausibility constraints, we need not utilize the usual approaches–
where one concavifies the value function or uses the experiments-as-convex-functions
idea [10, 14, 15]. Instead, we can solve for the equilibrium of the game directly, in part
using insights gleaned from Hulko and Whitmeyer [11]. The unique equilibrium here
has the same intuitive property as the unique equilibrium of the two-player dice game
in [11]. As shown by Hulko and Whitmeyer, the famous non-transitivity of generalized
dice2, results in cycles of best responses a la “Rock-Paper-Scissors”; e.g. die A beats
die B beats die C beats die A. The only die impervious to this is the standard die (the
analog of the uniform distribution in this paper), which guarantees a payoff of 1/2 to
2Or, “Efron’s Dice”; see [9, 17, 19].
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both players. Thus, while the standard die does not beat any other die, it does not lose
to any other die either.
In this paper, we arrive at a similar result in the two-player case, which is a corollary
of our n-player result. Indeed, this result for two-players features as a lemma (Lemma
4.1) in Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015) [6], who look at a two-player problem in which
schools must choose students to admit to their respective schools and then design a
competitive grading policy. For a given mean less than or equal to 1/2, the unique
equilibrium is the uniform distribution, which guarantees a payoff of at least 1/2 to
the player who chooses it. Then, when µ > 1/2, we have to modify this somewhat
because the uniform distribution is no longer an equilibrium. Surprisingly, the unique
equilibrium must have a point mass at 1 and then a portion with a linear distribution.
For a general number of players n, the crucial cutoff is 1/n; and moreover, the
equilibrium distribution is the (n − 1)-th root of x. Thus, as n grows the continuous
portion of the distribution becomes increasingly concave. As in the two-player case, if
the mean is too high (greater than 1/n) then at equilibrium each player puts a point
mass on 1. Then, for a fixed mean, as the number of players increases, each player places
increasingly more weight as a point mass on 1. As n goes to infinity, the equilibrium
distribution converges to one consisting merely of point masses on 1 and 0, of weight µ
and 1− µ, respectively.
Finally, we would be remiss should we not mention the other papers in the realm
of competitive information design. The area of Bayesian Persuasion and information
design is growing rapidly, but there are still relatively few papers that look at competitive
information provision. As mentioned above, this paper generalizes a result of Boleslavsky
and Cotton [6], and the methods used in this paper–the use of calculus of variations
techniques to directly solve for the equilibrium distribution–are novel in the literature.
Moreover, because we derive a full characterization of the equilibrium for a general n, we
are able to fully characterize the effect of an increase in population size on competitive
information provision.3
3It has recently come to our attention that Spiegler [18], in looking at firms selling to a boundedly
rational consumer, formulates a model that is extremely similar to ours in which the given mean is
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An additional paper similar to this one is that by Koessler, Laclau, and Tomala [13].
Each player in their game designs a signal structure that contains information about
their respective (independent) pieces of information, with the goal of persuading the
decision-maker to take the player’s preferred action. Similarly, in a pair of papers, Au
and Kawai [2, 3] also look at the situation where a number of persuaders compete through
information provision. Board and Lu [5], in turn, look at information in a search setting.
In concert with the insight derived in [3] and [5] we establish that competition elicits
greater information provision. In another paper, Boleslavsky and Cotton [7] look at
another two-player game of competitive persuasion in which agents provide information
in order to secure funding for proposals. Similarly, Albrecht [1], looks a two-player game
consisting of two parties vying for the support of a voter. His paper is another real world
manifestation of the two-player case of our problem.
1.2 Formulating the Problem
Formally, let the sample space, Ω, be the closed interval [0, 1] and B be the σ-Algebra of
Borel sets on [0, 1]. Define random variable Xi, i ∈
{
1, 2, . . . , n
}
as the identity random
variable. We define a strategy for a player i as follows:
Definition 1.1. Fix mean µ ∈ (0, 1). A Strategy for player i consists of a choice of
probability distribution Fi such that EFi
[
Xi
]
= µ. Write a player i’s strategy as the
duple Si := (Fi, Xi).
The game we shall analyze is constant sum and symmetric; and the payoff for Player
1, u1(S1, S−1), is given by
endogenous. The equilibrium in that study as well as the resulting insights are virtually the same as
the results here, although our approach is novel.
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u1(S1, S−1) = Pr(X1 > max
j 6=1
(Xj) +
1
n
Pr(X1 = X2 = · · · = Xn)
+
(
n− 1
n− 2
)
1
n− 1 Pr(X1 = X2 = · · · = Xn−1 > Xn)
...
+
(
n− 1
1
)
1
2
Pr(X1 = X2 > max
j 6=1,2
Xj)
In other words, players want their random variable to have the highest realization,
and ties are broken fairly. Before continuing we wish to make the following remark,
Remark 1.2. The set of mixed strategies is equal to the set of pure strategies.
To see this, note that every mixed strategy consists of some randomization over a
set of pure strategies, which is a probability distribution over probability distributions
of the random variable. However, this itself is clearly a probability distribution of the
random variable and so it is a pure strategy.
2 The n-Player Game
First, we write the following lemmata. The intuition behind them is straightforward;
simply, there are no symmetric equilibria in which players choose discrete distribu-
tions. A player may always deviate profitably from such distributions by shaving a
small amount of weight from the highest point in the support and moving this weight
to the other points in the support.
Lemma 2.1. There are no symmetric Nash Equilibria where players choose discrete
distributions supported on N(<∞) points.
Proof. It is easy to see that there is no symmetric equilibrium in which each player
chooses a distribution consisting of a single point mass. Such a distribution could only
consist of distribution with weight 1 placed on µ and would yield to each player a payoff
of 1/n. However, there is a profitable deviation for a player to instead place weight 1− 
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on µ + η and weight  on 0 (, η > 0). In doing so, this player could achieve a payoff
arbitrarily close to 1.
Now, assume∞ > N ≥ 2. Observe that a strategy consists of a choice of probabilities{
p1, p2, . . . , pN
}
, pi ∈ [0, 1] ∀i,
∑N
i=1 pi = 1 and support a1 < a2 < · · · < aN ∈
[0, 1] such that
∑N
i=1 aipi = µ.
The expected payoff to each player from playing an arbitrary strategy, S1 = S2 =
· · · = Sn = E, is
ui(Si, S−i) =
N−1∑
j=0
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
1
m− ip
n−i
N−j
(
N−j−1∑
k=1
pk
)i
We claim deviating to the following strategy is profitable: S ′1 where a
′
N = aN is
played with probability pN −  and a′j = aj + η is played with probability pj + j, for
j 6= N , where ∑N−1j j =  (Again, , η, j > 0 ∀j).4 The expected payoff to player 1
playing strategy S ′1 is
u1(S
′
1, S−1) =
N−1∑
j=0
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
1
n− ip
n−i
N−j
(
N−j∑
k=1
pk
)i
− 
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
1
n− ip
n−i−1
N (1− pN)i
+
N−1∑
j=1
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
n− i− 1
n− i p
n−i
N−j
(
N−j∑
k=1
pk
)i
Note that the deviation is profitable for the player 1 if

n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
1
n− ip
n−i−1
N (1− pN)i <
N−1∑
j=1
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
n− i− 1
n− i p
n−i
N−j
(
N−j∑
k=1
pk
)i ,
Which holds for a sufficiently small vector (1, ..., N−1).
Moreover, we can also show that there can be no distributions with point masses on
any point in [0, 1); to wit,
4Note that we can always find such an η > 0.
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Lemma 2.2. There are no symmetric Nash equilibria with point masses on any point in
the interval [0, 1). Moreover if µ < 1/n, then all symmetric equilibria must be atomless.
Proof. Using an analogous argument to that used in Lemma 2.1, it is easy to see that
there cannot be multiple point masses. Accordingly, it remains to show that there
cannot be a single point mass. First, we will show that there cannot be an atom at any
point b ∈ (0, 1). Suppose for the sake of contradiction that that there is a symmetric
equilibrium where each player plays a point mass of size p on point b. That is, each
player plays strategy S that consists of a distribution F and a point mass of size p on
point b. Let H(x) = F n−1. Then, player 1’s payoff is
u1(S1, S−1) =
∫ 1
0
∫ y
0
h(x)f(y)dxdy + p
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)(
1
n− i
)
F (b)ipn−1−i
Then, let player 1 deviate by introducing a tiny point mass of size  at 0 and moving
the other point mass to b + η and reducing its size slightly to p −  (, η > 0); call this
strategy S
′
1. The payoff to player 1 is
u1(S
′
1, S−1) =
∫ 1
0
∫ y
0
h(x)f(y)dxdy + (p− )
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
F (b+ η)ipn−1−i
Suppose that this is not a profitable deviation. This holds if and only if
p
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)(
1
n− i
)
F (b)ipn−1−i ≥ (p− )
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
F (b+ η)ipn−1−i
Or,
pn−1 + p
n−1∑
i=1
(
n− 1
i
)(
1
n− i
)
F (b)ipn−1−i
≥ n− 1
n
pn + (p− )
n−1∑
i=1
(
n− 1
i
)
F (b+ η)ipn−1−i
Clearly, as  and η go to zero we achieve a contradiction. Hence, there is a profitable
deviation and so this is not an equilibrium. It is clear that there cannot be an equilibrium
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with a point mass on 0 and so we omit a proof. Finally, we may conclude from the
analysis in the sections infra that there may not be a point mass on 1 if µ ≤ 1/n.
As will become clear, the value of µ is important in determining the equilibrium of
this game. We divide our analysis into the following two cases:
1) µ ≥ 1
n
(Section 2.1); and
2) µ < 1
n
(Section 2.2).
2.1 µ ≥ 1n
The main result of this section is the following theorem:
Theorem 2.3. In the game with n players, if µ ≥ 1/n then the unique symmetric Nash
equilibrium is for each player to play Fi, defined as
Fi(x) = (1− a)
(
x
s
)1/(n−1)
for x ∈ [0, s]
where a = µ− µ(1− a)n and s = nµ(1− a)n−1; and Pr(X = 1) = a.
Proof. First, we show that this is an equilibrium. Accordingly, we need to show that
there can be no unilateral profitable deviation. Define Z as maxi 6=1Xi, which, recall has
a point mass on 1. Moreover, define H as the corresponding continuous portion of the
distribution of Z; H := F n−1i :
H(z) = (1− a)n−1x
s
with associated density
h(z) =
(1− a)n−1
s
Evidently, it suffices to show that our candidate strategy achieves a payoff of at least
1/n to the player who uses it, irrespective of the strategy choice by the other players.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is a profitable deviation, that is, player
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1 deviates profitably by playing strategy G. Clearly, we can represent G as having a
point mass of size c, 0 ≤ c ≤ µ on 1 (naturally, if c = 0, then there is no point mass
there). Written out, G consists of
G(y) for x ∈ [0, 1) (G)
and Pr(Y = 1) = c. Define K :=
∫ 1
0
dG = 1− c. Naturally, K ≤ 1. Then, player 1’s
utility from this deviation, u1(G, S−1), is5
u1 = c
1− (1− a)n
na
+ (1− a)n−1(K −G(s))+ ∫ s
0
∫ y
0
h(x)g(y)dxdy
=
c
nµ
+ (1− a)n−1(K −G(s))+ ∫ s
0
∫ y
0
h(x)g(y)dxdy
Evidently, this is a profitable deviation if and only if u1 > 1/n; that is,
c
nµ
+ (1− a)n−1[K −G(s)]+ ∫ s
0
(1− a)n−1
s
yg(y)dy >
1
n
After some clever manipulation6, this reduces to
K >
∫ 1
s
1
s
yg(y)dy +G(s) (1)
It is clear that
∫ 1
s
1
s
yg(y)dy ≥ ∫ 1
s
g(y)dy and thus we have
K >
∫ 1
s
1
s
yg(y)dy +G(s) ≥
∫ s
0
g(y)dy +
∫ 1
s
g(y)dy = K
We have established a contradiction and thus the result is shown.
It remains to show uniqueness. To do this, we derive the candidate strategy presented
in the theorem above. First, through analogous arguments to those presented supra, it
5Note that the first term, c(1− (1− a)n)/na, is derived below, in the proof of Lemma 2.4.
6See Appendix A.1 for the detailed derivation.
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is clear that there cannot be multiple mass points, nor can there be any mass point in
the interval [0, 1). Hence, we allow for there to possibly be a point mass on 1, and show
it must satisfy the following inequality.
Lemma 2.4. Suppose that in a symmetric equilibrium each player puts a point mass of
size a ≥ 0 on 1. Then, a must satisfy a ≥ µ[1− (1− a)n].
Proof. Let each player play strategy Si = S where they each put weight a on 1. Suppose
that player 1 deviates and plays strategy Sˆ1 consisting of random variable Y distributed
with value 1 with probability µ and 0 with probability 1− µ.
Then, player 1’s payoff is
u1(Sˆ1, S−1) = µ
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)(
1
n− i
)
(1− a)ian−1−i (2)
Through judicious use of the binomial theorem7, we can write 2 as
u1(Sˆ1, S−1) = µ
1− (1− a)n
na
(3)
This must be less than or equal to 1/n:
1
n
≥ µ1− (1− a)
n
na
a ≥ µ[1− (1− a)n] (4)
There must also be a continuous portion of the distribution on some interval [t, s]
with t ≥ 0, s ≤ 1. Accordingly, our candidate equilibrium strategy, Fi, is of the following
form
Fi =

0 x ∈ [0, t)
Fi x ∈ [t, s)
1− a x = s
(Fi)
7See Appendix A.2.
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with 0 ≤ t < s ≤ 1 and Pr(X = 1) = a.8
We look for a symmetric equilibrium. Observe that distributions Fi must be such
that
∫ s
t
xfi(x)dx = µ− a
Fix Fj for j 6= i and define H as F n−1j . Given this distribution, we have the necessary
condition that Fi maximizes
1− (1− a)n
n
+
∫ s
t
fi(x)H(x)dx
We use calculus of variations techniques and so we define the functional J [f ] as the
Euler-Lagrange equation
J [fi] =
∫ s
t
fi(x)H(x)dx− λ0
[ ∫ s
t
fi(x)dx− (1− a)
]
− λ
[ ∫ s
t
xfi(x)dx− µ+ a
]
The first constraint ensures the distribution satisfies Kolmogorov’s second axiom,
and the second constraint guarantees that the expectation is µ.
The functional derivative is then
δJ(f(x))
δf(x)
= H(x)− λ0 − λx
This must equal 0 at a maximum, so we have,
H(x) = λ0 + λx
Then, by symmetry, H(·) = F n−1i (·). Moreover, we have two initial conditions that
allow us to obtain t and s. Using the conditions Fi(t) = 0 and Fi(s) = (1 − a), the
equilibrium distribution, Fi, must be
8It is clear that the weight on 1, a, cannot be µ in the symmetric equilibrium. To see this, note
that such a value for a would beget a distribution with binary support, which we already ruled out in
Lemma 2.1.
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Fi(x) = (1− a)
(
x− t
s− t
)1/(n−1)
with the corresponding pdf,
fi(x) =
1
x− t
(
1− a
n− 1
)(
x− t
s− t
)1/(n−1)
Note that we also need
∫ s
t
xfi(x)dx = µ− a, which reduces to
a =
nµ− [s+ (n− 1)t]
n− [s+ (n− 1)t] (5)
We now show that t must be 0:
Lemma 2.5. The lower bound of the continuous portion of the distribution, t, must be
0.
Proof. We leave the detailed proof for Appendix A.3. Our proof is through contradiction;
we suppose that there is a symmetric equilibrium in which t > 0, and show that there
exists a profitable deviation.
Finally, we pin down the size of the weight on 1:
Lemma 2.6. The weight on 1, a, is given by a = µ− µ(1− a)n.
Proof. The detailed proof may be found in Appendix A.4.
Corollary 2.7. If µ = 1/n, then the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium is for each
player to play strategy Fi :=
(
x
nµ
)1/(n−1)
supported on [0, nµ].
Proof. We need to show that a = 0 and s = 1. Recall that we have a = µ− µ(1− a)n,
which becomes 0 = (1−a)n+na−1 when µ = 1/n. It is easy to see that this polynomial
has a root at a = 0. For convenience, define b = 1− a, and after rearranging we obtain
µ =
1− b
1− bn (6)
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or, for µ = 1/n,
1
n
=
1− b
1− bn
Define ϕ := (1 − b)/(1 − bn) − µ. Clearly, ϕ is decreasing in b for b ∈ [0, 1], and
is therefore increasing in a over the same domain. As a result, a must be 0. We can
substitute this into s = (1− a)n−1 and obtain that s = 1.
We write the following result, which describes the effect of an increase in the number
of players.
Theorem 2.8. Fix µ > 1/n. Then, if the number of players is increased, the weight
placed on 1 in the symmetric equilibrium must increase. That is, a is strictly increasing
in n. Moreover, s is strictly decreasing in n.
In the limit, as the number of players, n, becomes infinitely large, the weight on 1
converges to µ. That is, the equilibrium distribution converges to a distribution with
support on two points, 1 and 0.
Proof. Define b = 1 − a and ϕ as above (the right hand side of 6). Recall that for
b ∈ [0, 1], ϕ is decreasing in b and therefore increasing in a over the same interval.
Moreover, we make take the partial derivative with respect to n:
∂ϕ
∂n
=
(1− b)bn ln(b)
(bn − 1)2 < 0
Thus, as n increases, the a needed to satisfy the above expression must increase.
That is, more and more weight is put on 1. Concurrently, s, or the upper bound of the
continuous portion of the distribution is shrinking, since, recall
s =
n(µ− a)
1− a
and thus
∂s
∂a
=
−n(1− µ)
(1− a)2
Furthermore, as n goes to infinity, we see that a goes to µ.
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Figure 1: Effect of n on s and a at Equilibrium for µ = 1/2
An illustration of the relationship between n and the symmetric equilibrium values
of a and s is given in Figure 1.
2.2 µ < 1n
We write, simply
Theorem 2.9. If µ < 1/n then the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium is for each
player to play strategy Fi :=
(
x
nµ
)1/(n−1)
supported on [0, nµ].
Proof. From Corollary 2.7, it is clear that this distribution is the unique symmetric Nash
equilibrium for distributions restricted to [0, nµ]. However, here we wish to show that
this distribution is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium even for deviations on the
whole of [0, 1].
Consider the case where all n players play strategy Si, in which Xi has distribution
Fi(x) =
(
x
nµ
)1/(n−1)
. Suppose a player, say player 1, deviates, and plays any other strat-
egy Sˆ1 = G(y) supported on [0, 1] with mean µ. We wish to show that the probability
that maxi 6=1Xi < Y is less than or equal to 1/n.
For convenience define the new random variable Z := maxi 6=1Xi. Evidently, Z has
distribution H(z) = z
nµ
, with associated density h(z) = 1
nµ
.
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Suppose for the sake of contradiction that this deviation is profitable for player 1:
u1(Sˆ1, S−1) > 1/n. Then,
u1(Sˆ1, S−1) =
(
1−G(nµ))+ ∫ nµ
0
∫ y
0
g(y)h(z)dzdy
=
(
1−G(nµ))+ ∫ nµ
0
y
nµ
g(y)dy
Thus, our supposition above holds if and only if
(
1−G(nµ))+ ∫ nµ
0
y
nµ
g(y)dy >
1
n
1
n
−
∫ 1
nµ
y
nµ
g(y)dy > G(nµ)− n− 1
n
Or,
1 > G(nµ) +
∫ 1
nµ
y
nµ
g(y)dy ≥ G(nµ) +
∫ 1
nµ
g(y)dy = 1
We have established a contradiction and thus we conclude that there is no profitable
deviation. Uniqueness is immediate, following similar arguments to those used in proving
Theorem 2.3.
2.3 Any Positive Support
We finish by solving for the unique equilibrium when players may choose any positive
support for the random variable Xi. We write the following theorem.
Theorem 2.10. Fix µ > 0. The unique symmetric Nash equilibrium is for each player
to play strategy Fi :=
(
x
nµ
)1/(n−1)
supported on [0, nµ].
The proof is analogous to that for Theorem 2.9 and so is omitted. This problem,
of course, is sensible should our interpretation be one of sellers choosing a distribution
of qualities for a product. If on the other hand, our problem is one of competitive
persuasion (with the Bayes-plausibility constraint relaxed), this environment (allowing
for the support chosen to be any subset of <+) is not appropriate.
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2.4 Arbitrary Ranking
We can further generalize the model by characterizing the unique symmetric equilibrium
for the situation where each player’s objective is to have at least the kth highest real-
ization (with ties settled randomly). This would correspond to the scenario with k ≥ 1
buyers.
3 Brief Discussion
To put succinctly, in the game examined in this paper, the uniform distribution (or more
generally, the distribution F (x) = x1/(n−1)) is supreme. What is important is that the
distribution of the random variable maxj 6=iXj; the distribution each player i faces, is
uniform. The intuition behind this result is simple; the uniform does not allow for one’s
opponent to achieve a payoff higher than 1/n. If the exogenously given mean is too
high; however, any continuous distribution on the interval falls vulnerable to deviation
by putting a point mass at 1 and so to counter this at equilibrium players must put a
point mass on 1.
As the number of players grows, the cutoff beyond which a point mass is necessary
shrinks and the size of the point mass on 1 grows. Moreover, as the number of players
becomes infinitely large, each player will have to put all of the weight µ on the point
1. If however, the players can choose any positive support for their distribution then
they can continue to enlarge the interval of support as n grows and they never have to
include a point mass.
Thus, we can see that there is interesting intuition that can be gleaned from this
problem. If the mean is relatively small (µ < 1/n), then the players do not use the top
portion of their intervals at all, since that portion of the distribution is too “valuable”,
so-to-speak, and is better spread out over the lower portion of the interval. If we think of
the problem as one of a posterior distribution over prizes induced by signals, this means
that there is no fully informative signal for the highest realization of the prize. This
runs counter to the seminal result from [12], where the highest state always induces the
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“high” signal.
Then, as the number of players grows, players will use more and more of the top
portion of the intervals. Furthermore, if the number of players is sufficiently high, or
equivalently, if the mean becomes sufficiently large, then the players must put a point
mass at 1. As the number of players grows beyond the cutoff, each player will increase
the weight on 1 and the support of the continuous portion of the distribution will shrink.
Finally, in the limit, equilibrium will consist of two point masses. Looking again at the
problem as the choice of posteriors, we see that the players become increasingly “honest”
about the high realization. Consonantly, as n grows (in the persuasion setting with a
binary prior) we get full revelation in the limit–competition forces the players to reveal
everything.
From the point of view of the consumer; then, an increase in the number of players is
a good thing. They would ideally draw from distributions with the maximum variance,
which is the distribution supported on the end points of the interval. Thus, as the
number of players becomes infinitely large, the equilibrium converges to one that is
consumer-optimal.
Overall, this paper can seen as an analysis of a competitive persuasion problem for the
situation in which the agents have a common binary prior, or for the general competitive
persuasion problem where the Bayes-plausibility constraint is relaxed. Moreover, our
results apply to a variety of problems beyond information design. Our setup models the
unconstrained version of competition between agents who each must mix or choose a
mixture of some type or quality, which mixtures are each then randomly sampled from
and the highest chosen.
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A.1 Equation 1 Derivation
Claim A.1.
c
nµ
+ (1− a)n−1[K −G(s)]+ ∫ s
0
(1− a)n−1
s
yg(y)dy >
1
n
is equivalent to
K >
∫ 1
s
1
s
yg(y)dy +G(s)
Proof.
c
nµ
+ (1− a)n−1[K −G(s)]+ ∫ s
0
(1− a)n−1
s
yg(y)dy >
1
n
c− µ
nµ(1− a)n−1 +K +
∫ s
0
1
s
yg(y)dy > G(s)
c− µ
nµ(1− a)n−1 +K +
∫ 1
0
1
s
yg(y)dy > G(s) +
∫ 1
s
1
s
yg(y)dy
c− µ
nµ(1− a)n−1 +
µ− c
s
+K > G(s) +
∫ 1
s
1
s
yg(y)dy
K >
∫ 1
s
1
s
yg(y)dy +G(s)
Where we used the fact that
∫ 1
0
(1/s)yg(y)dy = µ− c and s = nµ(1− a)n−1.
A.2 Equation 3 Derivation
Claim A.2.
µ
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)(
1
n− i
)
(1− a)ian−1−i = µ1− (1− a)
n
na
Proof. First, define k := n− 1− i and so we have
µ
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)(
1
n− i
)
(1− a)ian−1−i = µ(1− a)n−1
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
1
k + 1
(
a
1− a
)k
Then, we have the identity.
n∑
k=0
1
k + 1
(
n
k
)
zk =
(z + 1)n+1 − 1
(n+ 1)z
and so we simply set z := a
1−a , and after some algebra the proof is completed.
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A.3 Lemma 2.5 Proof
Proof. Let Players 2 through n play Fi supported on [t, s] and have a point mass of size
a on 1. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that t > 0. Recall,
Fi(x) = (1− a)
(
x− t
s− t
)1/(n−1)
Thus, the cdf of the maximum of this, H := F n−1, is
H(x) = (1− a)n−1
(
x− t
s− t
)
and
h(x) = (1− a)n−1
(
1
s− t
)
Let Player 1 play some alternate strategy G supported on [0, s] such that the density
is positive on some portion of [0, t] and have a point mass of size a on 1. Then, player
1’s expected payoff is:
u =
1− (1− a)n
n
+
∫ s
t
∫ y
t
h(x)g(y)dxdy
=
1− (1− a)n
n
+
∫ s
t
(1− a)n−1
(
y
s− t
)
g(y)dy −
∫ s
t
(1− a)n−1
(
t
s− t
)
g(y)dy
=
1− (1− a)n
n
+
∫ s
0
(1− a)n−1
(
y
s− t
)
g(y)dy −
∫ t
0
(1− a)n−1
(
y
s− t
)
g(y)dy
−
∫ s
0
(1− a)n−1
(
t
s− t
)
g(y)dy +
∫ t
0
(1− a)n−1
(
t
s− t
)
g(y)dy
=
1− (1− a)n
n
+
∫ s
0
(1− a)n−1
(
y
s− t
)
g(y)dy −
∫ s
0
(1− a)n−1
(
t
s− t
)
g(y)dy
−
∫ t
0
(1− a)n−1
(
y
s− t
)
g(y)dy +
∫ t
0
(1− a)n−1
(
t
s− t
)
g(y)dy
=
1
n
+
∫ t
0
(1− a)n−1
(
t− y
s− t
)
g(y)dy >
1
n
where we used,
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1− (1− a)n
n
+
∫ s
0
(1− a)n−1
(
y
s− t
)
g(y)dy −
∫ s
0
(1− a)n−1
(
t
s− t
)
g(y)dy
=
1− (1− a)n
n
+ (1− a)n−1
(
µ− a
s− t
)
− (1− a)n
(
t
s− t
) (A1)
But, we can find µ− a explicitly. It is,
µ− a =
∫ s
t
yf(y)dy
=
∫ s
t
y
y − t
(
1− a
n− 1
)(
y − t
s− t
)1/(n−1)
dy
=
(1− a) (y − t) 1n−1 (y + (n− 1) t)
n (s− t) 1n−1
∣∣∣∣∣
s
t
=
(1− a) (s+ (n− 1) t)
n
Substitute this into A1:
1− (1− a)n
n
+ (1− a)n−1
(
µ− a
s− t
)
− (1− a)n
(
t
s− t
)
=
1− (1− a)n
n
+ (1− a)n
(
(s+ (n− 1) t)
n(s− t)
)
− (1− a)n
(
t
s− t
)
=
1− (1− a)n
n
+ (1− a)n
(
(s+ (n− 1) t− nt)
n(s− t)
)
=
1− (1− a)n
n
+ (1− a)n
(
s− t
n(s− t)
)
=
1
n
Thus, there is a profitable deviation and so t must equal 0.
A.4 Lemma 2.6 Proof
Proof. Recall that in Lemma 2.4 we show that a ≥ µ− µ(1− a)n. Thus, it is sufficient
to show here that a ≤ µ− µ(1− a)n.
We divide the following into two cases. In the first case, suppose that µ ≤ s. Note
that it cannot be a profitable deviation for a player to play a strategy consisting of s
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played with probability µ/s and 0 with probability 1−µ/s. This condition is equivalent
to A2:
1
n
≥ (1− a)
n−1µ
s
(A2)
Or,
s ≥ n(1− a)n−1µ (A3)
From 5, and using the fact that t = 0, we have
a =
nµ− s
n− s
Or,
s =
n(µ− a)
(1− a) (A4)
We substitute this into A3 and obtain
n(µ− a)
(1− a) ≥ n(1− a)
n−1µ
µ− µ(1− a)n ≥ a
For the second case, suppose now that µ > s. By similar logic to the above, it
cannot be a profitable deviation for a player to play a strategy consisting of s played
with probability (1− µ)/(1− s) and 1 with probability (µ− s)/(1− s). That is,
1
n
≥
(
1− µ
1− s
)
(1− a)n−1 +
(
µ− s
1− s
)(
1− (1− a)n
na
)
(A5)
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that a > µ − µ(1 − a)n. Additionally, for
convenience, define k := (1− a)n. A5 can be rearranged to obtain:
s
(
1− k − a) ≥ an(1− µ) k
(1− a) + µ(1− k)− a
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We substitute A4 and rearrange to obtain:
n(µ− a)(1− k − a) ≥ ank(1− µ) + µ(1− k)(1− a)− a(1− a)
µ
(
n+ a− an− 1)− (1− a)a(n− 1) ≥ µk((n− 1)(1− a)) (A6)
Our assumption above that a > µ − µ(1 − a)n is equivalent to µk > µ − a. We
substitute this into A6 and cancel:
µ
(
n+ a− an− 1)− (1− a)a(n− 1) ≥ µk((n− 1)(1− a))
µ
(
n+ a− an− 1)− (1− a)a(n− 1) > (µ− a)((n− 1)(1− a))
0 > 0
We have achieved a contradiction and have thereby shown that a ≥ µ − µ(1 − a)n.
This, combined with Lemma 2.4 allows us to conclude the result, that a = µ−µ(1−a)n.
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